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OPINION 
________________  
 
SMITH, Chief Judge.  
 
Respondent-Petitioner New Vista Nursing and 
Rehabilitation, LLC (“New Vista”), contends that the licensed 
practical nurses (“LPNs”) employed at its nursing home could 
not unionize because they were “supervisors.”  The LPNs are 
supervisors, New Vista argues, because they have the 
“authority” to “discipline other employees[] . . . or effectively 
to recommend such action.”  29 U.S.C. § 152(11).  New Vista 
explains that the LPNs had such authority because their duties 
included filling out forms known as “Employee Warning 
Notices” or “Notices of Corrective Action,” which 
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recommended discipline for certified nursing assistants 
(“CNAs”). 
After New Vista refused to bargain with the LPNs’ 
union, the National Labor Relations Board (the “Board”) held 
that New Vista’s refusal to bargain was unlawful because, 
among other things, the nurses did not have the authority to 
effectively recommend discipline.  To determine whether the 
LPNs had such authority, the Board applied a four-part test 
squarely at odds with our controlling precedent—specifically 
NLRB v. Attleboro Associates, Ltd., 176 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 
1999).  Therefore, we will deny the Board’s petition for 
enforcement and grant New Vista’s cross-petitions for 
review.  In doing so, we will remand this case to the Board to 
allow it to determine whether the LPNs have the authority to 
effectively recommend discipline under Attleboro. 
Before we can move to the analysis by which the 
Board should determine whether the LPNs are statutory 
supervisors, we will first address the sundry procedural 
arguments advanced by New Vista.  After the Supreme 
Court’s decision in NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 
(2014), and our post–Noel Canning remand to the Board to 
clear up procedural and jurisdictional issues, we conclude that 
New Vista’s procedural arguments are meritless. 
BACKGROUND 
There are three levels of nursing staff at the New Vista 
home who are supervised by the Director of Nursing: (1) the 
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“nursing supervisor” during the evening shift or “unit 
manager” during the morning shift; (2) LPNs1; and 
(3) “Certified Nurse Aides” also known as “certified nursing 
assistants” or “CNAs.”  See New Vista Nursing & Rehab., 
LLC, 357 N.L.R.B. 714, 715 (2011); JA0073–75; JA0079; 
JA0881.  In January 2011, 1199 SEIU United Healthcare 
Workers East (the “Union”) filed a petition to represent the 
LPNs.2   
The Board approved the bargaining unit and required 
that an election be held to determine whether the Union 
                                           
 
1 Registered nurses or “RNs” interchangeably occupy the 
same position as the LPNs.  See, e.g., New Vista Nursing & 
Rehab., LLC, Case No. 22-RC-13204, slip op. at 4 (Mar. 9, 
2011) (regional director’s decision) (“One nurse (either an 
RN or an LPN) is assigned to each unit on the floor . . . .”), 
available at 
http://apps.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458045c16b, 
request for review denied (Apr. 8, 2011), available at 
http://apps.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d4580471
8e4; JA0074 (“They could be an RN or an LPN.”).  We 
use record citations for Regional Director J. Michael 
Lightner’s order, JA0848–80; New Vista Nursing & 
Rehab., LLC, No. 22-RC-13204 (Mar. 9, 2011).  A copy 
of the order and the denial of the request for review can 
be accessed at the above URLs. 
2 The CNAs are already represented by the Union.  See, 
e.g., JA0180.   
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would serve as the LPNs’ bargaining representative.  
JA0848–50, 0878–79.  The bargaining unit was defined to 
include “[a]ll full-time and regular part-time Licensed 
Practical Nurses employed by the Employer at its Newark, 
New Jersey facility, excluding all other employees, guards, 
and supervisors as defined by the Act.”  JA0849–50.   
One of New Vista’s main objections to the bargaining 
unit was that the LPNs were supervisors under 29 U.S.C. 
§ 152(11) because they have the “authority” to “discipline 
other employees[] . . . or effectively to recommend such 
action.”  If they were supervisors, the LPNs would not have a 
statutory right to be represented in collective bargaining.  See 
29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (“The term ‘employee’ . . . shall not 
include . . . any individual employed as a supervisor . . . .”); 
see also NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 
718 (2001) (“The Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 
(Taft-Hartley Act) expressly excluded ‘supervisors’ from the 
definition of ‘employees’ and thereby from the protections of 
the Act.”).  To determine whether an individual is a 
supervisor, the Supreme Court has provided a three-part test:  
Employees are statutory supervisors if (1) they 
hold the authority to engage in any 1 of the 12 
listed supervisory functions [in 29 U.S.C. 
§ 152(11)], (2) their “exercise of such authority 
is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but 
requires the use of independent judgment,” and 
(3) their authority is held “in the interest of the 
employer.” 
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Ky. River, 532 U.S. at 713 (quoting NLRB v. Health Care & 
Ret. Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571, 573–74 (1994)).  One of the 
twelve listed supervisory functions is “disciplin[ing] other 
employees.”  29 U.S.C. § 152(11). 
New Vista argued that it showed that the LPNs 
effectively have the power to discipline other employees 
because LPNs submitted disciplinary forms known as a 
“Notice of Corrective Action” or “Employee Warning 
Notice.”  E.g., JA0872–73, JA0884–86.   
The facts surrounding these forms were fiercely 
contested.  See JA0856–0862.  Some testimony suggested 
LPNs did not use the forms to effectively recommend 
discipline.  One of the nurses had never seen the Employee 
Warning Notice until just prior to her testimony.  See JA0276; 
see also JA0329.  Similarly, testimony by another nurse was 
that LPNs rarely (if ever) recommended a specific kind of 
discipline.  See JA0330.   
There was, however, countervailing evidence that 
supported New Vista’s position.  Most notably, Director of 
Nursing Victoria Alfeche testified that LPNs, in the exercise 
of their own discretion, frequently filled out these forms.  
Further, Alfeche explained that LPNs could recommend a 
specific type of discipline and that she acted on the forms as a 
matter of course.  See JA0098–99, 0148. 
In his March 9, 2011 order, NLRB Regional Director 
J. Michael Lightner rejected New Vista’s argument, applying 
a four-part test based on a vacated NLRB opinion:  “To 
prevail, the Employer must prove that: (a) LPNs submit 
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actual recommendations, and not merely anecdotal reports, 
(b) their recommendations are followed on a regular basis, (c) 
the triggering disciplinary incidents are not independently 
investigated by superiors, and (d) the recommendations result 
from the LPNs’ own independent judgment.”  JA873 (citing 
ITT Lighting Fixtures, 265 N.L.R.B. 1480, 1481 (1982), 
vacated on other grounds sub nom. ITT Lighting Fixtures, 
Div. of ITT Corp. v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1983)).  
Director Lightner’s conclusion rested heavily on his finding 
that LPNs “simply report[ed] factual findings to their 
superiors without any specific recommendation for 
disciplinary action” and that the “higher authorities” at New 
Vista proceeded with independent investigations upon 
receiving the forms.  See JA0873–74.  Director Lightner also 
noted that there were very few examples in the record of 
LPNs who filled out the forms other than Grace Tumamak.  
See JA0875.  Director Lightner further found that forms filled 
out by Ms. Tumamak could not show the authority of other 
LPNs because Ms. Tumamak served as the unit manager on 
one shift and as an LPN on another.  See JA0850.   
The election to determine whether the Union would 
serve as the LPNs’ bargaining representative was held on 
April 8, 2011.  See JA0039.  A majority of LPNs voted to be 
represented by the Union by a vote of 26 to 7.  See id.  Four 
additional votes were challenged.  See id. 
That same day, the Board denied New Vista’s request 
for review of Director Lightner’s order that directed the 
election would occur.  See JA0911, available at 
http://apps.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d45804718e4.   
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Because such denials are nonreviewable, New Vista 
pursued the standard course of testing the Union’s 
certification by refusing to bargain.  See NLRB v. FedEx 
Freight, Inc., 832 F.3d 432, 435 n.1 (3d Cir. 2016); JA0021; 
JA0042 (“Dear All; We are testing the certification and will 
not be bargaining.”).  New Vista asserted that the LPNs were 
statutory supervisors and, even if they had not been prior to 
the certification, they were as of March 25, 2011, because of 
a change in the LPNs’ duties.  See JA0049, 0053. 
In a decision and order dated August 26, 2011, the 
Board (Liebman, Becker, Hayes)3 unanimously granted 
summary judgment in favor of the Union and against New 
Vista.  See New Vista Nursing & Rehab., LLC, 357 N.L.R.B. 
714. 
The Board’s order granting summary judgment on the 
refusal to bargain charge and many of its subsequent orders 
denying New Vista’s motions for reconsideration took place 
during what may fairly be described as unusual times for the 
                                           
 
3 Member Pearce recused.  See New Vista Nursing & 
Rehab., LLC, 357 N.L.R.B. 714, 714 n.1 (2011).  
Throughout this opinion, we frequently note which Board 
members voted on particular orders.  We do so because 
many of New Vista’s challenges go to whether certain 
members had already resigned, were illegally appointed, 
or should have recused from a particular decision—not 
because the identity of the Board is of significance for 
any other reason. 
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Board.  The political branches had not filled many of the 
vacancies on the Board.  This led then-President Obama to 
make a series of recess appointments to fill the vacancies.  
See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2557–58 (2014) 
(describing the recess appointments); id. at 2557 (“As of 
January 2012, Flynn’s nomination had been pending in the 
Senate awaiting confirmation for approximately a year.”).  As 
is relevant here, there were two different sets of recess 
appointments:  (1) Craig Becker was recess appointed to the 
Board in 2010, and (2) Sharon Block, Terence Flynn, and 
Robert Griffin were all recess appointed in 2012.  See NLRB 
v. New Vista Nursing & Rehab., 719 F.3d 203, 213 (3d Cir. 
2013), abrogated by Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550; id. at 
244–45 (Greenaway, Jr., J., dissenting). 
As described below, if there are an insufficient number 
of Board Members, the Board will be unable to muster a 
quorum.  Without a quorum, the Board cannot issue legally 
enforceable orders.  The National Labor Relations Act 
(“NLRA”) provides that the Board shall have five members.  
29 U.S.C. § 153(a).  As the Supreme Court has held, there are 
three Board quorums, of which the first and third must exist 
for any given NLRB decision to be valid under 29 U.S.C. 
§ 153(b).  See generally New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 
560 U.S. 674 (2010).  First, three members of the Board 
constitute a quorum of the entire Board.  See 29 U.S.C. 
§ 153(b) (“[T]hree members of the Board shall, at all times, 
constitute a quorum of the Board . . . .”); New Process Steel, 
560 U.S. at 680 (“Interpreting the statute to require the 
Board’s powers to be vested at all times in a group of at least 
three members is consonant with the Board quorum 
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requirement, which requires three participating members ‘at 
all times’ for the Board to act.” (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 153(b)).  
Second, the Board may delegate its power to a three-member 
group.  See 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (“The Board is authorized to 
delegate to any group of three or more members any or all of 
the powers which it may itself exercise.”); New Process Steel, 
560 U.S. at 679 (“The first sentence of § 3(b), which we will 
call the delegation clause, provides that the Board may 
delegate its powers only to a ‘group of three or more 
members.’” (quoting Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 
§ 3(b), Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136, 139 (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 153(b))).  Third, two members of any 
three-member group constitute a quorum of a three-member 
group.  See 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (“[T]wo members shall 
constitute a quorum of any group designated pursuant to the 
first sentence hereof.”); New Process Steel, 560 U.S. at 681 
(“[T]he group quorum provision, which still operates to 
authorize a three-member delegee group to issue a decision 
with only two members participating, so long as the delegee 
group was properly constituted.”).  The two-member quorum 
of a three-member group ceases to exist as a viable quorum 
when the Board has fewer than two members.  See New 
Process Steel, 560 U.S. at 679.   
On September 7, 2011, New Vista began filing the first 
of what would ultimately be five motions for reconsideration, 
arguing that the Board acted ultra vires because it had too few 
Members either serving or involved in a particular decision.   
In its First Motion for Reconsideration, New Vista 
argued that the August 26, 2011 order was ultra vires because 
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it was posted on the Board’s website after the expiration of 
the term of one of its signing members—then-Chairman 
Wilma Liebman.  According to New Vista, if Chairman 
Liebman had not legally participated in the August 26, 2011 
order, the delegee group only consisted of two members in 
violation of 29 U.S.C. § 153(b).  See JA0051.  New Vista also 
argued it was entitled to a hearing to investigate changed 
circumstances in the LPNs’ authority to supervise, pursuant to 
Frito-Lay, Inc., 177 N.L.R.B. 820 (1969). 
On September 13, 2011, the Board filed an application 
for enforcement of its August 26, 2011 order with this Court.  
See JA0001. 
On December 30, 2011, the Board (Becker, Hayes) 
denied New Vista’s First Motion for Reconsideration.  As to 
Chairman Liebman, the Board explained that the August 26, 
2011 order was made final prior to the August 27 end of 
Chairman Liebman’s term and that the Board’s subsequent 
acts with regard to the August 26, 2011 order were 
ministerial.  See JA0012–14.  With regard to the Frito-Lay 
argument, the Board rejected it “[f]or the reasons set forth in 
the Board’s August 26, 2011 Decision and Order.”  JA0014. 
On January 3, 2012, New Vista filed its Second 
Motion for Reconsideration.  The Second Motion argued that 
the December 30, 2011 order denying the First Motion for 
Reconsideration was not decided by a “proper quorum” 
because one of the three members of the panel, Chairman 
Pearce, had recused.  See JA0055–57.  Because the panel 
consisted only of Members Becker and Hayes, it was, 
according to New Vista, improperly constituted. 
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On January 9, 2012, New Vista filed a petition for 
review of the December 30 order with this Court.  See 
JA0002–03.  We have treated this petition as a cross-petition 
for review opposing the Board’s petition for enforcement of 
the August 26, 2011 order.  
On March 14, 2012, New Vista filed its Third Motion 
for Reconsideration.  New Vista argued that the Board’s 
December 30, 2011 order denying the First Motion for 
Reconsideration was ultra vires because Member Becker’s 
recess appointment ended on December 17, 2011.  According 
to New Vista, the Board (Becker, Hayes) lacked a two-person 
quorum to issue its December 30, 2011 order.  See JA0058–
59. 
On March 15, 2012, the Board (Hayes, Griffin, Block) 
denied New Vista’s Second Motion for Reconsideration.  The 
Board held that there was a quorum for the December 30, 
2011 order denying the First Motion for Reconsideration.  
Specifically, the March 15, 2012 order relied on the fact that, 
pursuant to New Process Steel, a two-member quorum of a 
panel can issue legally enforceable orders.  See JA0015–16.  
The March 15, 2012 order quoted from the December 30, 
2011 order showing that Pearce engaged in the delegation of 
power to the two-member quorum and then recused.  See 
JA0016 (“Chairman Pearce, who is recused and did not 
participate in the underlying decision, is a member of the 
present panel but did not participate in deciding the merits of 
this proceeding.”).   
On March 22, 2012, New Vista filed its Fourth Motion 
for Reconsideration, arguing that Members Griffin and Block 
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were not Board members on March 15, 2012 because they 
had been illegally appointed during an intrasession recess.  
See JA60–61.  New Vista again argued that the December 30, 
2011 order was improper because Becker was no longer a 
Board member on December 30, 2011.  See id. 
On March 27, 2012, the Board (Hayes, Griffin, Block) 
denied the Third and Fourth Motions for Reconsideration.  
See JA0017–18.  The Board stated that the Board properly 
delegated its authority to a three-member panel and would 
“not entertain any further motions for reconsideration 
challenging the authority of the Board in this matter.”  Id. 
On April 5, 2012, New Vista filed a petition for review 
of the March 15 and March 27 orders.  See JA0004–06.  We 
granted New Vista’s request that this petition be consolidated 
with New Vista’s earlier petition for review for all purposes.  
These consolidated petitions for review are collectively 
treated as a cross-petition opposing the Board’s petition for 
enforcement of the August 26, 2011 order. 
On May 16, 2013, we ruled on the Board’s petition 
and New Vista’s cross-petitions, holding that the “delegee 
group acted without power and lacked jurisdiction” when it 
issued the August 26, 2011 order because Becker’s recess 
appointment was invalid.  New Vista, 719 F.3d at 221, 244.  
Specifically, we held that recess appointments were legal only 
when made during Congress’s “intersession breaks.”  Id. at 
208.   
Shortly thereafter, the Board filed a petition for 
rehearing en banc.  On July 16, 2013, we stayed further 
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consideration of New Vista pending the Supreme Court’s 
resolution of Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 
2013), which also addressed the legality of recess 
appointments to the Board.  See Order, No. 12-1027 (3d Cir. 
filed July 15, 2013).   
On June 26, 2014, the Supreme Court issued its 
decision in Noel Canning.  134 S. Ct. 2550.  The Supreme 
Court held that, as used in the Appointments Clause, “the 
phrase ‘the recess’” is not limited to recesses between 
congressional sessions.  Id. at 2561.  Recess appointments 
could be made during an intrasession recess, but such a recess 
that is “less than 10 days is presumptively too short to fall 
within the Clause.”  Id. at 2567.  Further, “pro forma 
sessions” are not “periods of recess,” so no recess 
appointments could be made during any intrasession recess 
punctuated by pro forma sessions fewer than ten days apart.  
Id. at 2574.   
Applying those rules, the Supreme Court held that 
Griffin’s and Block’s recess appointments were invalid.  
When Griffin and Block received their recess appointments, 
the Senate had been holding “pro forma sessions every 
Tuesday and Friday.”  Id. at 2557.  Because these pro forma 
sessions limited the length of the intrasession recess, the 
resulting 3-day recesses were “too short to trigger the 
President’s recess-appointment power.”  Id. at 2574.   
At the same time, the Supreme Court implied that 
Member Becker’s appointment was valid because it was 
made during a two-week intrasession recess.  See id. at 2558 
(“The President appointed Member Becker during an intra-
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session recess that was not punctuated by pro forma sessions, 
and the vacancy Becker filled had come into existence prior 
to the recess.”); see also New Vista, 719 F.3d at 213 
(“Member Becker . . . was appointed on March 27, 2010, one 
day after the Senate ‘adjourn[ed]’ for two weeks.” (quoting 
156 Cong. Rec. S2180 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 2010) (statement of 
Sen. Kaufman)).   
Following the Supreme Court’s Noel Canning 
decision, we granted the Board’s motion for panel rehearing.  
In response to this Court’s questions, the Board admitted it 
“undisputedly lacked a quorum” for its March 15, 2012, and 
March 27, 2012 orders.4  Motion of the National Labor 
Relations Board for Limited Remand of the Administrative 
Record, No. 11-3440, Doc No. 003112144322 (3d Cir. Dec. 
2, 2015).  The Board requested that we remand the 
administrative record so that it could rule on the motions for 
reconsideration it denied in March 2012.  See id.  We granted 
                                           
 
4 Because the Board undisputedly lacked a quorum in 
March 2012, this Court may have lacked jurisdiction over 
this case had we not remanded because submitting the 
record creates jurisdiction in this Court, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 160(e) (“Upon the filing of the record with it the 
jurisdiction of the court shall be exclusive and its 
judgment and decree shall be final.”), and the Board may 
have lacked the power to submit the record when it did so 
on March 27, 2012, see NLRB Certified List 
Transmitted, No. 11-3440 (3d Cir. filed Mar. 27, 2012). 
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the motion for remand.  See Order, No. 11-3440 (3d Cir. filed 
Dec. 4, 2015).   
On remand, the Board (Miscimarra, Hirozawa, 
McFerran) again denied New Vista’s Second and Third 
Motions for Reconsideration on the merits and then denied 
New Vista’s Fourth Motion for Reconsideration as moot.  
SA14–18.   
New Vista then filed a Fifth Motion for 
Reconsideration, arguing a lack of transparency and that there 
was no valid quorum to enter the most recent order because 
Member Hirozawa should have recused himself.  Among 
other things, New Vista claimed that Member Hirozawa’s 
former law firm represented the Union in this case.  See 
SA19–20.  On January 5, 2016, the Board denied the Fifth 
Motion for Reconsideration, with Member Hirozawa denying 
the request for recusal.  See SA21–26.  The Board explained 
that New Vista knew that the Board planned to review the 
Fourth Motion for Reconsideration “expeditiously.”  SA23.  
As to recusal, the Board referred New Vista to an attached 
statement by Member Hirozawa.  See id.  Member Hirozawa 
explained that he did not recuse because, among other things, 
he had no involvement with “this matter or any other matter 
concerning” New Vista while in private practice and his first 
work on this case was more than five years after he left his 
previous firm.  See SA24–26.   
Following New Vista’s denial of the Fifth Motion for 
Reconsideration, we ordered supplemental briefing and 
requested a supplemental appendix.  See Order, No. 11-3440 
(3d Cir. filed Jan. 21, 2016).  Having received this 
19 
 
supplemental material, we now review the Board’s petition 
for enforcement and New Vista’s cross-petitions for review. 
JURISDICTION 
We have jurisdiction over the Board’s petition for 
enforcement pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) and jurisdiction 
over New Vista’s petitions to review the Board’s final order 
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 160(f).  See 800 River Rd. Operating 
Co. LLC v. NLRB, 784 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 2015). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
“The Board’s legal determinations are subject to 
plenary review, but we will uphold the Board’s interpretations 
of the Act if they are reasonable.”  MCPc Inc. v. NLRB, 813 
F.3d 475, 482 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Mars Home for Youth v. 
NLRB, 666 F.3d 850, 853 (3d Cir. 2011)).  “[W]e will accept 
the Board’s factual findings and the reasonable inferences 
derived from those findings if they are ‘supported by 
substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole.’”  
Advanced Disposal Servs. E., Inc. v. NLRB, 820 F.3d 592, 
606 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 160(f)).  Where the 
Board has adopted the Regional Director’s findings, we 
perform our substantial evidence review of the Regional 
Director’s findings.  See MCPc, 813 F.3d at 482.   
We review a Board member’s decision whether to 
recuse under an abuse-of-discretion standard, reversing only 
when a decision is “arbitrary or unreasonable.”  1621 Route 
22 W. Operating Co., LLC v. NLRB, 825 F.3d 128, 143–44 
(3d Cir. 2016).  
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DISCUSSION 
To put it mildly, motions for reconsideration have 
piled up in this case.  The following table shows the tangled 
nature of the five motions for reconsideration: 
 21 
 
Orders and Motions under Consideration 
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We will address the motions for reconsideration in 
reverse chronological order.  In resolving all of these 
motions, as we do, in favor of the Board, we conclude 
that we must remand so that the Board may apply an 
appropriate test to determine whether the LPNs have the 
authority to discipline other employees. 
I. THE FIFTH MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION (RESOLVED IN THE 
BOARD’S JANUARY 5, 2016 ORDER) 
New Vista’s Fifth Motion for Reconsideration 
alleged that the Board’s December 17, 2015 order was 
invalid because (1) New Vista did “not even know the 
Board was considering the matter”—in its brief, New 
Vista frames this as a “lack of transparency,” New Vista 
Supp. Br. 55—and (2) Member Hirozawa should have 
recused.  See SA19.  Both arguments fail. 
                                           
 
5 We cite to the parties’ responsive briefs following the 
order granting rehearing and filed September 29, 2014 
(New Vista), November 25, 2014 (NLRB), and 
December 9, 2014 (New Vista), as “New Vista 
Rehearing Br.,” “NLRB Rehearing Br.,” and “New Vista 
Rehearing Reply,” respectively.  We cite to the parties’ 
responsive briefs following the supplementation and 
resubmission of the record and filed February 22, 2016 
(New Vista), March 23, 2016 (NLRB), and April 6, 2016 
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First, with regard to the Board’s “transparency,” 
New Vista now argues that there were two failures: (a) 
the Board acted with “great alacrity” in resolving the 
Fourth Motion for Reconsideration in its January 5, 2016 
order, New Vista Supp. Br. 1–2, and (b) the Board 
engaged in unlawful ex parte communication with its 
general counsel prior to resolving the Fourth Motion for 
Reconsideration, see New Vista Supp. Br. 2–5.  The first 
argument does not present any legal deficiency and we 
do not have jurisdiction to address the second because it 
was not presented to the Board.  If we had jurisdiction, 
we would find this argument unavailing. 
With regard to the Board’s “alacrity” in resolving 
the Fourth Motion for Reconsideration or failure to tell 
New Vista that it would soon be resolving the Fifth 
Motion for Reconsideration, New Vista fails to present 
any factual or legal basis for overturning the January 5, 
2016 order.  First, New Vista provides no legal hook on 
which to hang its grievance.  And with regard to the 
facts, there is substantial evidence to support a finding 
that New Vista knew that the Board planned to act 
expeditiously.  The Board had previously advised this 
Court it would resolve New Vista’s outstanding motions 
within thirty days.  See SA4.  Accordingly, the Board is 
                                                                                              
 
(New Vista), as “New Vista Supp. Br.,” “NLRB Supp. 
Br.,” and “New Vista Supp. Reply,” respectively. 
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entitled to the benefit of the presumption of regularity.  
See Kamara v. Att’y Gen., 420 F.3d 202, 212 (3d Cir. 
2005).   
With regard to the ex parte communications 
argument, we lack jurisdiction to consider this argument 
because New Vista failed to raise this argument before 
the Board.  See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (“No objection that 
has not been urged before the Board, its member, agent, 
or agency, shall be considered by the court, unless the 
failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused 
because of extraordinary circumstances.”); FedEx 
Freight, 832 F.3d at 437 (“The crucial question in a 
section 160(e) analysis is whether the Board received 
adequate notice of the basis for the objection.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting FedEx Freight, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 816 F.3d 515, 521 (8th Cir. 2016))); id. at 448 
(“[T]he Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction to review 
objections that were not urged before the Board . . . .” 
(quoting Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, 456 
U.S. 645, 666 (1982))).  New Vista only argued in its 
motion (and the Board only addressed in its order) that 
the Board ruled too expeditiously and without notice.  
See SA19; SA23 (addressing only New Vista’s 
contentions that it was unaware that its reconsideration 
motion was being considered and that the Board ruled on 
the reconsideration motion too quickly). 
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Were we to reach New Vista’s ex parte 
communication argument, we would rule for the Board.  
The Board’s General Counsel alternates between two 
dramatically different roles in a labor litigation, 
depending on whether it is prosecuting a case before the 
Board or representing the Board in court.  As a result, the 
General Counsel’s communications are only ex parte 
when it prosecutes a case—not when it acts as the 
Board’s counsel in a court proceeding pursuant to a 
petition for enforcement or petition for review.6  Here, 
                                           
 
6 See 29 C.F.R. § 102.126(a) (2016) (“No interested 
person outside this agency shall, in an on-the-record 
proceeding of the types defined in § 102.128, make or 
knowingly cause to be made any prohibited ex parte 
communication to Board agents of the categories 
designated in that section relevant to the merits of the 
proceeding.”); 29 C.F.R. § 102.127(a) (2016) (“The term 
person outside this agency, to whom the prohibitions 
apply, shall include . . . the general counsel or his 
representative when prosecuting an unfair labor 
practice proceeding before the Board pursuant to 
section 10(b) of the Act.” (emphasis added)); 29 C.F.R. 
§ 102.130 (2016) (“Ex parte communications prohibited 
by § 102.126 shall not include[] . . . [o]ral or written 
communications from the general counsel to the Board 
when the general counsel is acting as counsel for the 
Board.” (emphasis added)). 
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the allegedly ex parte communications occurred on 
November 25, 2015, and December 2, 2015.  See New 
Vista Supp. Br. 3.  Both communications were made 
prior to this Court’s remand of the proceeding to the 
Board on December 4, 2015.  Therefore, at the time the 
General Counsel communicated to the Board, the 
General Counsel was operating in his capacity as 
“counsel for the board.”  29 C.F.R. § 102.130(f) (2016).  
By definition, his communications could not have been 
ex parte. 
Second, New Vista argues that Member Hirozawa 
should have recused for four reasons: (1) Member 
Hirozawa worked for Gladstein, Reif & Meginniss, LLP 
(“Gladstein”), prior to joining the Board, and Gladstein 
served as counsel for the Union in the instant matter; 
(2) in his previous position at the Board, Member 
Hirozawa worked as chief counsel for Chairman Pearce 
who also worked for Gladstein; (3) Member Hirozawa’s 
successor as counsel for Chairman Pearce actually 
represented the Union in this matter; and (4) Member 
Hirozawa may return to Gladstein.  See New Vista Supp. 
Br. 6–10. 
Member Hirozawa did not abuse his discretion by 
choosing not to recuse.  See 1621 Route 22 W. Operating 
Co., 825 F.3d at 143–44 (“We review an agency 
member’s decision not to recuse himself from a 
proceeding under a deferential, abuse of discretion 
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standard.” (quoting Metro. Council of NAACP Branches 
v. FCC, 46 F.3d 1154, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1995))). 
It was not unreasonable for Member Hirozawa to 
conclude that he did not need to recuse because he had 
not personally represented the Union in this matter and 
had been away from Gladstein for more than five years 
before having any involvement in the instant matter.  See 
SA25; cf. United States v. Dansker, 537 F.2d 40, 53–54 
(3d Cir. 1976) (holding that a judge did not need to 
recuse when the judge previously investigated a company 
with which the criminal defendants were associated 
because the criminal defendants’ allegations “merely 
evidence ‘an impersonal prejudice, (going) to the judge’s 
background and associations rather than his appraisal of 
the (movants) personally’”), abrogated on other grounds 
by Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 57 n.2 (1991). 
New Vista’s argument that Member Hirozawa 
should recuse because his successor as chief counsel to 
Chairman Pearce represented the Union in this matter 
and previously worked with Member Hirozawa provides 
no more reason for Member Hirozawa to recuse than the 
above-rejected argument that Member Hirozawa worked 
at Gladstein. 
Finally, New Vista suggests that Member 
Hirozawa should recuse because of the possibility that he 
may return to Gladstein.  See New Vista Supp. Reply 3 
(“[H]e could be back at his old, nine member, firm while 
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this case is still sub judice before this court .[sic]”).  This 
is rank speculation and it cannot therefore create an 
appearance of impropriety.  See Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 
Int’l v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 899 F.2d 1230, 1232 (D.C. 
Cir. 1990) (holding that “[t]he political branches of 
government, so far as we can tell, have never authorized 
as an ethical requirement” that the Secretary of 
Transportation be “disqualif[ied] from any matter 
affecting a client of a prospective employer”).   
Because the Board’s speed in resolving the Fourth 
Motion for Reconsideration was not unlawful and 
because Member Hirozawa did not abuse his discretion 
when he decided not to recuse, the Board correctly 
denied New Vista’s Fifth Motion for Reconsideration. 
II. THE SECOND, THIRD, AND FOURTH 
MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION (THE 
DECEMBER 17, 2015 ORDER) 
A. The Fourth Motion for Reconsideration 
In its Fourth Motion for Reconsideration, New 
Vista argued that, under alternate readings of the Recess 
Appointments Clause, either (a) Member Becker was not 
a Member when he joined in the December 30, 2011 
order (addressing the Second Motion for 
Reconsideration) or (b) Members Griffin and Block were 
not members when they joined in the March 15, 2012 
order (addressing the Third Motion for Reconsideration).  
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See JA0061.  According to New Vista, if the Senate 
“recessed” when it began having pro forma sessions, 
Becker’s recess appointment from the previous Session 
terminated.  But, New Vista’s argument goes, if the 
Senate were not in recess, Griffin and Block could not be 
appointed.  See id. 
In its December 17, 2015 order, the Board 
(Miscimarra, Hirozawa, McFerran) mooted New Vista’s 
Fourth Motion for Reconsideration by reaffirming the 
reasoning in its previous orders addressing New Vista’s 
Second and Third Motions for Reconsideration.  See 
SA17–18.  The December 17, 2015 panel was lawfully 
constituted.  Cf. Greater Omaha Packing Co., Inc. v. 
NLRB, 790 F.3d 816, 825 (8th Cir. 2015) (holding that an 
argument that an earlier decision was “decided by a panel 
that lacked a quorum” was not relevant to a particular 
later decision made by a panel that “was properly 
constituted”). 
B. The Third Motion for Reconsideration 
In the Third Motion for Reconsideration, New 
Vista argued that the December 30, 2011 order was 
invalid because Member Becker’s recess appointment 
expired on December 17, 2011 with the recess of the 
Senate.  See JA0058.   
Following Noel Canning, other courts have held 
that Becker’s appointment was valid.  We agree.  A valid 
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recess appointment lasts until the close of the next Senate 
session, which, in Becker’s case was January 3, 2012.  
Therefore, Becker was a duly appointed member of the 
quorum that decided the December 30, 2011 order.  
As noted above, Noel Canning held that, because 
Griffin and Block were appointed during recesses of 
fewer than ten days, when including pro forma sessions, 
their appointments were invalid.  See Noel Canning, 134 
S. Ct. at 2574.  Although the Supreme Court did not rule 
directly on the validity of Becker’s appointment, it noted 
that the circumstances surrounding his appointment were 
different from those that made the appointments of 
Griffin and Block invalid:  “The President appointed 
Member Becker during an intra-session recess that was 
not punctuated by pro forma sessions, and the vacancy 
Becker filled had come into existence prior to the 
recess.”  Id. at 2558.   
We agree with our sister courts of appeals that 
have decided this question:  Because Becker’s 
appointment was made in a recess of more than 17 days, 
Member Becker’s appointment was valid.  See Mathew 
Enter., Inc. v. NLRB, 771 F.3d 812, 814 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
(holding that Member Becker’s appointment “was 
constitutionally valid”); Gestamp S.C., L.L.C. v. NLRB, 
769 F.3d 254, 257–58 (4th Cir. 2014) (similar); 
Teamsters Local Union No. 455 v. NLRB, 765 F.3d 1198, 
1201 (10th Cir. 2014) (similar). 
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Based on Noel Canning, there can be no question 
that Becker’s appointment lasted through the December 
30, 2011 order.  A recess appointment does not expire 
until the end of the next Senate session.  See U.S. Const. 
art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (“The President shall have Power to fill 
up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of 
the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire 
at the End of their next Session.” (emphasis added)); 
Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2565 (contemplating that 
recess appointments would terminate at the end of the 
next Senate session). 
Because the Senate did not declare an intersession 
recess, Member Becker’s recess appointment expired on 
January 3, 2012, when the new congressional session 
began.  See Dodge of Naperville, Inc. v. NLRB, 796 F.3d 
31, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (explaining that Member 
Becker’s tenure ran through noon on January 3, 2012); cf. 
Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2558 (“[T]he second session 
of the 112th Congress began on January 3, 2012 . . . .”); 
NLRB v. Bluefield Hosp. Co., LLC, 821 F.3d 534, 538 
(4th Cir. 2016) (“As of January 3, 2012, the terms of 
three of the Board’s five members had expired.”).   
Because Member Becker was acting as a validly 
appointed Member of the Board when he joined the 
December 30, 2011 order, the Board correctly denied the 
Third Motion for Reconsideration.   
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C. The Second Motion for Reconsideration 
In the Second Motion for Reconsideration, New 
Vista stated that the Board’s December 30, 2011 order 
was invalid because the third member of the panel, 
Chairman Pearce, was recused and therefore could not 
delegate his power to the remaining two members of the 
Board.  See JA055.  The Board has stated that Pearce 
recused after delegating his power.  We conclude the 
delegation was permissible.   
On December 30, 2011, when the order was 
issued, the Board consisted of three members: Pearce, 
Becker, and Hayes.  Pearce determined he had a conflict 
and therefore could not participate substantively.  As 
noted above, the Board’s organic statute, as interpreted 
by New Process Steel, allows the Board to delegate its 
powers to a three-member panel and for two members to 
constitute a quorum of a three-member panel.  See 29 
U.S.C. § 153(b); New Process Steel, 50 U.S. at 681 
(“[T]he group quorum provision . . . still operates to 
authorize a three-member delegee group to issue a 
decision with only two members participating, so long as 
the delegee group was properly constituted.”).  Thus, 
Becker and Hayes could properly enter the December 30, 
2011 order if and only if the Board (Pearce, Becker, 
Hayes) delegated its power to a three-member panel 
(Pearce, Becker, Hayes) from which Pearce then recused.  
See D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 353 (5th 
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Cir. 2013) (“[T]wo members of that panel may decide a 
case ‘if, for example, the third member had to recuse 
himself from a particular matter.’ . . .  [T]he Board could 
validly issue its decision through two of its members, 
provided that the Board delegated authority to a three-
member panel and that such a panel still existed when the 
two members acted.” (quoting New Process Steel, 560 
U.S. at 679)). 
That is what the Board did here.  The December 
30, 2011 order explained:  “Chairman Pearce, who is 
recused and did not participate in the underlying 
decision, is a member of the present panel but did not 
participate in deciding the merits of this proceeding.”  
JA0012 n.2 (emphasis added).   
New Vista challenges the Board’s delegation to a 
three-member panel of Pearce, Becker, and Hayes on the 
ground that Pearce had already recused himself from the 
matter and therefore could not have participated in the 
delegation of the Board’s power to a three-member panel 
and could not be considered a member of the three-
member panel.  See New Vista Rehearing Br. 52 (“Since 
Chairman Pearce previously recused himself from 
consideration of the case, he could not participate in the 
decision to delegate to a panel . . . and could not be a 
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member of the panel delegated to determine New Vista’s 
reconsideration request.” (citation omitted)).7   
We see no reason to look behind the Board’s 
statement that Chairman Pearce participated in the 
delegation and then recused from substantive 
deliberations.  Other courts have approved this 
procedure.  Cf. D.R. Horton, 737 F.3d at 354 (“There is 
                                           
 
7 Ordinarily, there is no procedural unfairness when a 
conflicted decisionmaker delegates his or her authority to 
a neutral decisionmaker—indeed, that is what a recusal 
essentially entails.  Cf. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 
Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“As 
the investigation proceeded, in December of 2003, the 
Attorney General recused himself from participation and 
delegated his full authority in the investigation to the 
Deputy Attorney General as Acting Attorney General.”); 
Muffley ex rel. NLRB v. Spartan Mining Co., 570 F.3d 
534, 539 (4th Cir. 2009) (“The General Counsel, in turn, 
recused himself (because of personal ties to the case) and 
delegated [the Board’s statutory] power in the case at 
hand to the Deputy General Counsel.”); U.S. Office of 
Government Ethics, OGE Informal Advisory 
Memorandum 99 X 8, 1999 WL 33308429, at *4 (Apr. 
26, 1999) (“Recusal will mean that someone else must 
act in the employee’s stead concerning any matters that 
could affect the disqualifying interest.”). 
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no indication that the Board deviated from its customary 
practice of delegating authority to the three-member 
panel and allowing two members to decide the case when 
Member Hayes recused.”); Brown v. Trueblue, Inc., No. 
1:10-CV-0514, 2012 WL 1268644, at *6 n.7 (M.D. Pa. 
Apr. 6, 2012) (agreeing that the procedure in D.R. Horton 
was valid in light of New Process Steel). 
With Pearce’s involvement, three members of the 
Board participated in the delegation of the order denying 
the First Motion for Reconsideration.  As we next 
discuss, the Board correctly denied the First Motion for 
Reconsideration.   
III. THE FIRST MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION (THE DECEMBER 30, 2011 
ORDER) 
New Vista’s First Motion for Reconsideration 
raised two issues with the August 26, 2011 order.  First, 
New Vista argued that the August 26, 2011 order was 
ultra vires because the term of one of the three Members 
signing the order—Chairman Liebman—expired before 
the order was mailed and posted on the Board’s website.  
See, e.g., JA0052; New Vista Rehearing Br. 32, 40–48.  
As we stated in our previous New Vista opinion, 
Chairman Liebman was a member of the panel when the 
order was decided, and later ministerial acts are irrelevant 
to the question of the order’s validity.  See New Vista, 
719 F.3d at 213–15.  Second, New Vista argued that the 
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Board failed to distinguish Frito-Lay, a past NLRB 
decision that required a hearing when there were changed 
circumstances.  As the Board has noted in subsequent 
cases, Frito-Lay applies only when the changed 
circumstances result from a process begun prior to the 
representation proceeding before the Board.  Here, the 
Board did not apply Frito-Lay because it believed the 
changed circumstances were in response to the Board 
proceedings.  Cf. NLRB v. Sw. Reg’l Council of 
Carpenters, 826 F.3d 460, 464 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he 
Board need not address ‘every conceivably relevant line 
of precedent in [its] archives,’ but it must discuss 
‘precedent directly on point.’” (quoting Lone Mountain 
Processing, Inc. v. Sec’y of Labor, 709 F.3d 1161, 1164 
(3d Cir. 2013))). 
First, with regard to New Vista’s objection 
concerning Chairman Liebman, we previously answered 
this objection in our 2013 opinion.  See New Vista, 719 
F.3d at 213–15.  Although we vacated our opinion with 
our August 11, 2014 Order granting rehearing in this 
case, we reaffirm our earlier reasoning on this issue.  We 
stated then that the Board’s August 26, 2011 order “is 
entitled to a presumption of regularity.”  New Vista, 719 
F.3d at 214 (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting 
Frisby v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 755 F.2d 
1052, 1055 (3d Cir. 1985)).  The order was dated August 
26 and states that Chairman Liebman approved the 
decision contained therein.  See id.  The Board’s failure 
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to post the order on its website prior to the August 27, 
2011 expiration of Chairman Liebman’s term does not 
rebut the presumption of regularity.  See id. at 214–15.8 
                                           
 
8 In our now-vacated ruling, we cited Braniff Airways, 
Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 379 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 
1967), for the proposition that ministerial acts that occur 
after a decisionmaker has left power do not deprive the 
original decision of effect.  See New Vista, 719 F.3d at 
214.  New Vista argues our earlier reasoning is wrong 
because Braniff Airways states that an order is treated as 
complete “once all members have voted for an award and 
caused it to be issued.”  Braniff Airways, 379 F.2d at 459.  
New Vista then argues that Braniff supports its position 
because there is neither “substantial evidence” of when 
Liebman “‘voted for’ or ‘signed’ it and of whether and 
when she ‘caused it to be issued.’”  New Vista Rehearing 
Br. 43.  As we explained in our original decision, “the 
presumption of regularity requires that we consider the 
date as the record of when the delegee group caused the 
opinion to be issued, which presupposes that they voted 
on or before that date.”  New Vista, 719 F.3d at 215. 
 Moreover, any distinction between “voting for” the 
decision and “causing it to be issued” is irrelevant.  For 
example, if one orders flowers on February 11 and the 
flowers are delivered on Valentine’s Day, that person has 
“caused” the flowers to be delivered on February 11, 
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With regard to Frito-Lay, 177 N.L.R.B. 820 
(1969), New Vista first argues that the Board “fail[ed] to 
hold a hearing on . . . changed factual circumstances” as 
required by that decision.  New Vista Rehearing Br. 17–
18, 49–51.  Later in its brief, however, New Vista 
concedes that its real objection is that the Board failed to 
“distinguish” Frito-Lay.  New Vista Rehearing Br. 50; 
see also id. (“This Court requires the NLRB, in order to 
dispel any appearance of arbitrariness, to set forth the 
reasons for not following its prior decisions and the 
distinctions that compel a different result in order to be 
enforced.”); New Vista Rehearing Reply 22 (“[T]he 
                                                                                              
 
even though there are intermediate steps (credit card 
processing, packaging, delivery, etc.) between the order 
and the February 14 delivery. 
 New Vista flatly misreads the record when it 
argues that “the NLRB concedes [A0013] that the 
Decision and Order were not ‘ready for issuance’ until 
after August 26, 2011.”  New Vista Rehearing Br. 45.  In 
fact, the cited page states: “There is no dispute that the 
Board dated the above-referenced Decision and Order 
August 26, 2011.  Consistent with Board practice, the 
date of the Decision and Order reflects the date on which 
all members had voted on the final draft.  At that point, 
the Decision and Order was ready for issuance to the 
public and service on the parties.”  JA0013 (emphasis 
added). 
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NLRB has yet to explain why Frito Lay got a hearing and 
New Vista did not . . . .”).   
But the Board’s August 26, 2011 order makes 
abundantly clear why this is not a situation where Frito-
Lay applies.  In Frito-Lay, the relevant changes to the 
duties of the employees were implemented based on the 
results of a consulting firm’s study of the employer’s 
organization that “beg[a]n . . . before this proceeding was 
instituted.”  Frito-Lay, Inc., 177 N.L.R.B. 820, 821 
(1969).  The Board found that the Frito-Lay changes 
“[were] clearly not for the purpose of avoiding 
compliance with the Board’s unit finding.”  Id.   
By contrast with Frito-Lay, in the August 26, 2011 
order, the Board took notice of the Board’s own 
allegations that changes to the LPNs’ duties were made 
unlawfully to “prevent them from obtaining union 
representation.”  New Vista, 357 N.L.R.B. at 715 n.3.9  In 
                                           
 
9 In response to those allegations, the Board (Hayes, 
Griffin, Block) ultimately “found that the employer . . . 
altered the duties of licensed practical nurses to convert 
them into statutory supervisors in order to prevent them 
from obtaining union representation.”  See New Vista 
Nursing & Rehab., LLC, 358 N.L.R.B. 473 (2012).  But 
this finding has likely been nullified by Noel Canning, as 
acknowledged by the Board, see Colonial Parking, 363 
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so doing, the Board cited one of several cases that 
distinguishes Frito-Lay on these grounds.  See id. at 715 
n.5 (citing Telemundo de P.R., Inc. v. NLRB, 113 F.3d 
270, 279 (1st Cir. 1997)).  Indeed, New Vista’s brief 
acknowledges several cases explaining that a business 
has to show that the alleged changed circumstances 
preexisted the representation proceeding, which New 
Vista failed to do here.  See Comar, Inc, 349 N.L.R.B. 
342, 359 n.36 (Feb. 2, 2007) (“Frito-Lay is also 
inapplicable because the invalidation of the unit there 
was based on a major overhaul of the employer’s national 
management structure, which the Board found 
completely eliminated the level of organizational control 
upon which the unit was premised and was ‘clearly not 
for the purpose of avoiding compliance with the Board’s 
unit finding.’”); K Mart Corp., 323 N.L.R.B. 583 (1996); 
see also Telemundo de P.R., 113 F.3d at 278 (“An 
employer who seeks to overcome that presumption bears 
a heavy burden of showing that a legitimate business 
necessity arising out of circumstances that were in play 
before the representation proceeding concluded forced 
him to recast job descriptions.”).  Because the Board 
found that the facts here were distinguishable from those 
                                                                                              
 
N.L.R.B. No. 90, at 1 n.1 (2016), and, in any event, is 
now pending before this Court, see No. 12-3524.  
Accordingly, we do not rely on this finding.   
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in Frito-Lay, there was no need for the Board to invoke 
Frito-Lay simply to distinguish it. 
IV. WHETHER THE LPNs ARE SUPERVISORS 
(THE AUGUST 26, 2011 ORDER) 
Having considered all five of New Vista’s motions 
for reconsideration, we finally arrive at the merits: 
whether the LPNs have the effective authority to 
recommend discipline.  In its August 26, 2011 order, the 
Board applied a test that is incompatible with our 
caselaw.  Specifically, the Board relied on the evidence 
that management independently investigated the LPNs’ 
written complaints and that few LPNs apparently 
submitted written complaints.  Our caselaw holds that 
those are inappropriate factors on which to rely.  We will 
therefore remand for further consideration. 
Before discussing how the Board got it wrong, we 
first set out important legal factors the Board must follow 
on remand.  See MCPc, 813 F.3d at 487 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(“Because the ALJ and Board’s rejection of these 
rationales may have stemmed from confusion as to the 
appropriate analytical framework, we address the choice 
of test before turning to its application in this case.”).   
Whether LPNs in a given nursing home are 
statutory supervisors is a factbound question about which 
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different circuits have suggested different rules.10  See 
NLRB v. Attleboro Assocs., Ltd., 176 F.3d 154, 163 (3d 
Cir. 1999) (“[R]esolution of the question of whether a 
charge nurse exercises independent judgment is 
inherently factual in nature, although the cases suggest 
that similar organizational structures exist throughout the 
nursing home industry.”); see, e.g., Frenchtown 
Acquisition Co. v. NLRB, 683 F.3d 298, 308 (6th Cir. 
2012) (no supervisory status for nurses who, in a 
progressive disciplinary system, had authority only to 
“bring [nurses’] aide errors or misconduct to a manager’s 
attention,” but not to “decide how to proceed” with that 
information); Schnurmacher Nursing Home v. NLRB, 
214 F.3d 260, 265–66 (2d Cir. 2000) (“In actual practice, 
the CNs appear not to have formally disciplined CNAs or 
even to have recommended discipline, albeit, the CNs 
                                           
 
10 As noted above, there is a three-part test to determine 
whether an employee is a statutory supervisor: (1) the 
employee “hold[s] the authority to engage in any 1 of the 
12 listed supervisory functions” in 29 U.S.C. § 152(11), 
(2) the employee’s “exercise of such authority is not of a 
merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of 
independent judgment,” and (3) the employee’s authority 
is held “in the interest of the employer.”  Ky. River, 532 
U.S. at 713.  Here, the issue is whether the nurses held 
the authority to effectively recommend discipline and 
whether they used independent judgment. 
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did, from time to time, refer CNA misconduct to a nurse 
manager but without recommendation.”). 
Our last word on the subject was in Attleboro 
Associates.  In Attleboro, we contrasted existing 
precedent from other circuits and found the Attleboro 
nurses were supervisors because they had the authority, 
when confronted with misbehavior, to make a decision to 
do nothing, “counsel an offending CNA directly, or 
initiate a progressive disciplinary process that becomes 
part of a CNA’s permanent personnel file and could lead 
to her termination.”  Attleboro, 176 F.3d at 165. 
Attleboro rejected the Board’s position that an 
employee does not have authority to effectively 
recommend discipline if the employee’s supervisors 
independently investigate the employee’s 
recommendation.  Similar to this case, in Attleboro, the 
Board argued: “[T]o be supervisory, the actions taken 
‘must not only initiate, or be considered in determining 
future disciplinary action, but also . . . must be the basis 
for later personnel action without independent 
investigation or review by superiors.’”  Br. for the 
NLRB, Attleboro, 176 F.3d 154 (Nos. 98-6168, 98-6211) 
(3d Cir. Dec. 7, 1998), 1998 WL 34176828, at *35 
(quoting Passavant Health Care Ctr., 284 N.L.R.B. 887, 
889 (1987)).   
Relying heavily on Glenmark Associates, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 147 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. 1998), we rejected the 
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Board’s position and held that the LPNs had the power to 
effectively supervise the CNAs.  See Attleboro, 176 F.3d 
at 164–66.  We noted approvingly that Glenmark 
“recognized that the NLRA does not preclude a charge 
nurse from having supervisory status merely because her 
recommendation is subject to a superior’s investigation.”  
Attleboro, 176 F.3d at 164.  Thus, we concluded that “an 
acceptance of the Board’s reading of the NLRA in this 
case ‘would . . . render the statutory phrase “effectively 
to recommend” nugatory.’”  Attleboro, 176 F.3d at 165–
66 (quoting Caremore, Inc. v. NLRB, 129 F.3d 365, 370 
(6th Cir. 1997)). 
In addition to relying on Glenmark, Attleboro 
distinguished (1) an Eighth Circuit decision and (2) a 
District of Columbia Circuit decision that both held that 
nurses were not statutory supervisors.  First, in the Eighth 
Circuit case, the key fact was that the “nurses’ 
disciplinary authority consisted ‘solely of the power to 
verbally reprimand [nursing assistants].’”  Attleboro, 176 
F.3d at 165 (quoting Beverly Enters. v. NLRB, 148 F.3d 
1042, 1046 (8th Cir. 1998)).11    
                                           
 
11 Our Attleboro precedent noted that the nurses in the 
Eighth Circuit case were held not to be “‘an integral part 
of the disciplinary process’ and ‘play[ed] no role in 
determining whether an employee is disciplined or in 
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Second, in the D.C. Circuit case, “the record did 
not reveal any instances where a charge nurse exercised 
th[e] authority” to discipline.  Attleboro, 176 F.3d at 165 
(emphasis added) (discussing Beverly Enters.-Mass., Inc. 
v. NLRB, 165 F.3d 960 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).  Thus, the D.C. 
Circuit held that the nurses’ authority was merely “a 
speculative possibility, which absent demonstration, is 
simply ‘paper power.’”  Beverly Enters.-Mass., 165 F.3d 
at 964.  This was in contrast to Attleboro where the 
nurses “initiate[d] a progressive disciplinary process, and 
their decisions to write up a CNA bec[a]me a permanent 
part of the CNA’s personnel file.”  Attleboro, 176 F.3d at 
165. 
Thus, we held that “because Attleboro’s LPN 
charge nurses make a decision to counsel an offending 
CNA directly, or initiate a progressive disciplinary 
process that becomes part of a CNA’s permanent 
personnel file and could lead to her termination, the 
charge nurses effectively recommend discipline using 
independent judgment within the meaning of section 
2(11).”  Id.  Although Attleboro repeatedly points out that 
the progressive disciplinary process employed in that 
                                                                                              
 
determining the type of discipline to be imposed.’”  
Attleboro, 176 F.3d at 165 (quoting Beverly Enters., 148 
F.3d at 1046).  Here, the Board arguably made those 
same findings.   
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case could ultimately lead to termination, it is clear that a 
nurse can be a statutory supervisor if he or she has the 
authority to effectively recommend less onerous 
discipline.  For instance in Warner Co. v. NLRB, we held 
that “sending a[n employee] home is discipline”—as was 
“cal[ing] the plant manager’s attention to instances of . . . 
violations of the work rules.”  365 F.2d 435, 439 (3d Cir. 
1966).  This is also implicit in the statutory text because 
29 U.S.C. § 152(11) states, among other things, that a 
supervisor can “hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, . . . 
discharge, . . . or discipline other employees.”  Were 
“discipline” the same as “lay[ing] off” or 
“discharg[ing],” the word “discipline” would have been 
mere surplusage.  See Langbord v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Treasury, 832 F.3d 170, 182 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc) 
(“We assume . . . that every word in a statute has 
meaning and avoid interpreting one part of a statute in a 
manner that renders another part superfluous.” (quoting 
Disabled in Action of Pa. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 539 
F.3d 199, 210 (3d Cir. 2008))). 
Following and citing Attleboro, we further held in 
another case that the “number of instances” of 
supervision does not determine whether employees are 
supervisors.  See NLRB v. Prime Energy Ltd. P’ship, 224 
F.3d 206, 210 (3d Cir. 2000) (“The mere fact that the 
regional director found only one instance where a Shift 
Supervisor sent a Plant Operator home is hardly a 
reasonable basis to conclude that the authority was 
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lacking.  It simply suggests that the authority was rarely 
needed.”). 
Thus, applying Attleboro, we recognize three facts 
that together may show an employee is a statutory 
supervisor: (1) the employee has the discretion to take 
different actions, including verbally counseling the 
misbehaving employee or taking more formal action, see 
Attleboro, 176 F.3d at 165 (“Attleboro’s LPN charge 
nurses make a decision to counsel an offending CNA 
directly, or initiate a progressive disciplinary 
process . . . .”); (2) the employee’s actions “initiate” the 
disciplinary process, see id. (“The circumstances clearly 
are different here inasmuch as Attleboro’s charge nurses 
initiate a progressive disciplinary process . . . .”); and 
(3) the employee’s action functions like discipline 
because it increases severity of the consequences of a 
future rule violation, see id. (“[T]heir decisions to write 
up a CNA become a permanent part of the CNA’s 
personnel file and could lead to the CNA’s 
termination.”). 
And, from Attleboro and Prime Energy, we also 
derive two facts that do not disprove supervisory status: 
(1) whether a nurse’s supervisor undertakes an 
independent investigation, see Attleboro, 365 F.3d at 164 
(“[T]he ‘relevant consideration is effective 
recommendation or control rather than final 
authority.’ . . .  [T]he NLRA does not preclude a charge 
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nurse from having supervisory status merely because her 
recommendation is subject to a superior’s investigation.” 
(citations omitted) (describing Glenmark)); and 
(2) whether the employees exercise their supervisory 
authority only a few times (or even just one time), see 
Prime Energy Ltd. P’ship, 224 F.3d at 210. 
In the case before us, the Board relied on a four-
part test that conflicts with the above principles.  The 
Board derived its test from an NLRB opinion (later 
vacated) to determine whether the nurses here were 
statutory supervisors: “To prevail, the Employer must 
prove that: (a) LPNs submit actual recommendations, and 
not merely anecdotal reports, (b) their recommendations 
are followed on a regular basis, (c) the triggering 
disciplinary incidents are not independently investigated 
by superiors, and (d) the recommendations result from 
the LPNs’ own independent judgment.”  JA873 (citing 
ITT Lighting Fixtures, 265 N.L.R.B. 1480, 1481 (1982), 
vacated on other grounds sub nom. ITT Lighting 
Fixtures, Div. of ITT Corp. v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 
1983)).12   
                                           
 
12 In its brief in this case, the Board argues a rationale 
more consistent with Attleboro and other circuits’ 
caselaw.  But the Board should have considered 
Attleboro and other cases when it made its original 
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ruling—not after filing a petition for enforcement.  See 
Borovsky v. Holder, 612 F.3d 917, 921 (“The Chenery 
doctrine prevents a court from affirming an agency’s 
inadequately justified decision ‘by substituting what it 
considers to be a more adequate or proper basis’ for the 
decision.” (quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 
196 (1947))); NLRB v. P*I*E Nationwide, Inc., 923 F.2d 
506, 518 (7th Cir. 1991) (“The Board’s appellate counsel 
cannot fill in the holes in the agency’s decision; stated in 
another manner, it is the Board’s order, not its petition 
for enforcement, that is the subject of our review.  
Accordingly, we may not accept appellate counsel’s post 
hoc rationalizations for agency action.” (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted)); Henry J. Friendly, 
Chenery Revisited: Reflections on Reversal and Remand 
of Administrative Orders, 1969 Duke L.J. 199, 222 
(“Where the agency has rested [a] decision on an 
unsustainable reason, the court should generally reverse 
and remand even though it discerns a possibility, even a 
strong one, that by another course of reasoning the 
agency might come to the same result.”). 
For the same reason, the Dissent’s reliance on Mars 
Home for Youth v. NLRB, 666 F.3d 850 (3d Cir. 2011), is 
unavailing.  The dissent’s focus on the same conclusion 
being reached by our court in Mars Home and by the 
NLRB in this case is irrelevant to the question as to 
whether the NLRB offered correct reasoning.  The NLRB 
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Under controlling law, remand is appropriate 
where, as here, the Board used the wrong legal standard 
and remand would not be futile.  See, e.g., MCPc, 813 
F.3d at 482 (“[W]e will remand for further proceedings 
because the Board failed to apply the correct legal 
test . . . .”); id. at 490 (“[W]hether or not we agreed that 
substantial evidence in the record supported the Board’s 
                                                                                              
 
did not.  The NLRB did not rely on Mars Home or any 
post-Attleboro case in its explanation for what effectively 
recommending discipline meant.  Instead, it relied on 
pre-Attleboro reasoning that we held was unreasonable in 
Attleboro.  Just as the NLRB cannot rely on post hoc 
reasoning, the Dissent cannot now use Mars Home to fill 
in the hole in the NLRB’s decision.  See ICC v. Bhd. of 
Locomotive Eng’rs, 472 U.S. 270, 283 (1987) (“[A] 
court . . . may not affirm on a basis containing any 
element of discretion—including discretion to . . . 
interpret statutory ambiguities—that is not the basis the 
agency used, since that would remove the discretionary 
judgment from the agency to the court.”).  We agree that 
it may be inefficient to make the NLRB interpret the 
statute anew even though it may ultimately reach the 
same result, but that is a function of Chenery, which we 
must apply.  Cf. Margaret B. Kwoka, Deference, 
Chenery, and FOIA, 73 Md. L. Rev. 1060, 1109–10 
(2014) (“[C]ritics argue that the Chenery principle leads 
to inefficient proceedings . . . .”). 
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ultimate disposition, our disagreement with [the] Board’s 
rationale would prevent us from affirming.”); NLRB v. 
Alan Motor Lines Inc., 937 F.2d 887, 892 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(“If we sustained the Board’s decision based on a 
rationale that the Board might have adopted but did not 
adopt, we would ‘deprecate the administrative process 
for [we] would propel the court into the domain which 
Congress has set aside exclusively for the administrative 
agency.’” (quoting NLRB v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 
438, 444 (1965))).  By relying on a vacated NLRB 
precedent requiring the nurses’ recommendations be 
implemented without any independent investigation and 
relying heavily on the fact that the LPNs did not 
frequently exercise their alleged supervisory power, the 
Board applied the wrong legal standard.   
Nor would a remand be futile.  Neither side has 
shown it is entitled to victory on the present record.  On 
the one hand, the Board’s findings are almost entirely 
inapt because they are directed to the wrong test.  On the 
other hand, New Vista’s entitlement to victory is unclear.   
The Board has failed to show it is entitled to 
enforcement because Director Lightner’s findings 
addressed to the wrong test are largely inapplicable to the 
correct test.  See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 
(1943) (“The Commission’s action cannot be upheld 
merely because findings might have been made and 
considerations disclosed which would justify its order as 
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an appropriate safeguard for the interests protected by the 
Act.  There must be such a responsible finding.”); cf. 
NLRB v. Local 483, Int’l Ass’n of Bridge, Structural & 
Ornamental Ironworkers, 672 F.2d 1159, 1165 (3d Cir. 
1982) (“If such findings are supported by substantial 
evidence on the record as a whole, the Board’s remedial 
order would be enforceable by this court.  Such findings 
have not been made by the Board here.”).   
For instance, Director Lightner’s findings go to 
whether the LPNs’ written notices were independently 
investigated, whether LPNs ultimately decided the level 
of discipline, or whether LPNs frequently exercised 
authority to effectively recommend discipline.13  As 
                                           
 
13 Among those findings are: 
- “[D]iscipline issued to a CNA is investigated by unit 
managers or upper management.”  JA0861.   
- “The LPN becomes involved only as a fact witness to 
the underlying incident. . . .  LPNs are simply reporting 
factual findings to their superiors without any specific 
recommendation for disciplinary action.”  JA0861, 0873. 
- “LPNs rarely if ever checkmark the penalty level of 
discipline because they do not have access to employees’ 
personnel files and do not know where the employee 
stands in the progressive disciplinary scheme.”  JA0861. 
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such, they are irrelevant.  Indeed, some findings suggest 
that the nurses may be supervisors under Attleboro.  See, 
e.g., JA0856 (“If a nurse believes that a CNA has 
violated the Employer’s work rules, the nurse has the 
discretion to (1) do nothing; (2) verbally counsel the 
employee without issuing any write-up; or (3) report 
misconduct to either the nursing supervisor or unit 
manager.” (emphasis added)).  Because the factual 
findings do not support the necessary legal analysis, we 
lack the basis to enforce the Board’s decision.   
                                                                                              
 
- LPNs are not told “the outcome of a disciplinary 
matter” and do not attend meetings where the “discipline 
is served.”  JA0861–62. 
- “The DON or other upper management officials make 
all final disciplinary decisions.”  JA0862.   
- “The record shows LPN involvement in actual 
progressive discipline of CNAs 33 times over a 6 ½ year 
period. . . .  Even assuming arguendo that the actions of 
the LPNs cited by the Employer constituted discipline or 
the effective recommendation of discipline, the record 
still yields a minor number of instances over a six-year 
period in which these actions were exercised. . . .  I am 
reluctant to extinguish Section 7 rights here on such a 
slender record of disciplines over a six year stretch.”  
JA0871, 0876. 
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On the other hand, the record does not permit us to 
conclude that New Vista has proven the nurses are 
statutory supervisors.  See Ky. River, 532 U.S. at 712 (“In 
the unfair labor practice proceeding, therefore, the burden 
remains on the employer to establish the excepted status 
of these nurses.”).  For instance, it may well be that the 
notices issued by nurses do not become permanent parts 
of the CNAs’ files and are not used to increase the 
severity of the discipline.  Indeed, the paucity of 
disciplinary forms presented suggests that they are not 
kept in employees’ files.  Additionally, we are not 
unmindful of other circuits’ “reportorial” cases holding 
that where nurses merely report factual information 
without actually recommending discipline, the employer 
fails to show that the nurses have the authority to 
recommend discipline.  See, e.g., Schnurmacher Nursing 
Home, 214 F.3d at 265–66 (“In actual practice, the CNs 
appear not to have formally disciplined CNAs or even to 
have recommended discipline, albeit, the CNs did, from 
time to time, refer CNA misconduct to a nurse manager 
but without recommendation.”).  Yet, any finding that the 
nurses here were merely “reportorial” must be reconciled 
with the demands of Attleboro.  See Attleboro, 176 F.3d 
at 159 (noting that the Board’s “regional Director 
concluded that the LPN charge nurses merely were 
serving in a ‘reportorial’ and not supervisory 
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capacity”).14  While the Board’s finding that the LPNs 
had discretion in how they handled misbehaving CNAs, a 
                                           
 
14 The Board did not request deference to their reading of 
the statute under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), or Nat’l Cable & 
Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 
967 (2005), as they did in Palmetto Prince George 
Operating, LLC v. NLRB, 841 F.3d 211, 216–17 (4th Cir. 
2016) (deferring to the Board’s interpretation of the 
NLRA under Chevron and Brand X to hold that nurses 
were not supervisors).  Had they done so, it would not 
have availed them here.   
Unlike in Palmetto Prince George, the Board has not 
pointed to a new interpretation after the relevant 
controlling precedent.  See Palmetto Prince George, 841 
F.3d at 215–16 (relying on a 2006 NLRB interpretation 
instead of its 1998 precedent); see also Levy v. Sterling 
Holding Co., LLC, 544 F.3d 493, 502 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(“[T]he Supreme Court left no doubt that if a court of 
appeals interprets an ambiguous statute one way, and the 
agency charged with administering that statute 
subsequently interprets it another way, even that same 
court of appeals may not then ignore the agency’s more-
recent interpretation.” (emphasis added)).  Here, the 
Board relies on an interpretation that we already held was 
an unreasonable interpretation of the statute in Attleboro.  
NLRB v. Attleboro Assocs., Ltd., 176 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 
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1999) (“[W]e see no need to reduce the deference that we 
normally afford the Board, as we find the Board’s 
interpretation of ‘independent judgment’ inconsistent 
with the NLRA under the traditional deferential standard 
of review . . . .” (citing NLRB v. Health Care & Ret. 
Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571, 576 (1994)).  Chevron or 
Brand X deference would not allow us to adopt an 
unreasonable interpretation.  See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 
980 (“In Chevron, this Court held that ambiguities in 
statutes within an agency’s jurisdiction to administer are 
delegations of authority to the agency to fill the statutory 
gap in reasonable fashion.”). 
This case is also unlike Mars Home for Youth, on which 
the dissent heavily relies.  The Mars Home Regional 
Director’s opinion is in marked contrast to the one in this 
case.  See Mars Home for Youth, Case No. 6-RC-12692 
(Dec. 3, 2009) (regional director’s decision), available at 
http://apps.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d45802a3
b2c.  In Mars Home, the regional director set forth 
detailed analysis based on a series of post-Attleboro 
cases, primarily Berthold Nursing Care Ctr., Inc., 351 
N.L.R.B. 27 (2007), cited as Oak Park.  Because reliance 
on Oak Park is actually a new interpretation, the NLRB 
would have been entitled to Brand X deference in that 
case.  We further note (a) that Petitioner Mars Home for 
Youth did not cite Attleboro and therefore the case was 
not before the court, and (2) Mars Home for Youth did 
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remand would not be futile because the Board could find, 
for instance, that the LPNs do not “initiate a progressive 
disciplinary process.”  Attleboro, 176 F.3d at 165.   
We must remand. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, we will vacate the 
Board’s August 26, 2011 order and remand for the Board to 
apply the correct legal test on the merits issue.  
 
                                                                                              
 
not analyze the definition of “effectively to recommend” 
“discipline,” 29 U.S.C. § 152(3), the key issue here.   
1  
GREENAWAY, JR., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
  
 This case turns on the National Labor Relations Act’s 
(“NLRA”) definition of a “supervisor.”  To qualify as a 
supervisor, an employee must have the authority to exercise 
independent judgment in the performance of a supervisory 
function in the interest of the employer.  NLRB v. Health Care 
& Ret. Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571, 573–74 (1994).  This case 
concerns our interpretation of independent judgment generally 
and specifically in the context of recommending discipline.  
 In Mars Home for Youth v. NLRB, 666 F.3d 850 (3d Cir. 
2011), we approved of the general and specific interpretations 
of independent judgment at issue here.  With only passing 
reference to Mars Home, the Majority rejects the general and 
specific interpretations of independent judgment before us.  
Instead of relying on Mars Home, the Majority rests its 
decision on NLRB v. Attleboro Associates, Ltd., 176 F.3d 154 
(3d Cir. 1999), and concludes, in a final footnote, that 
Attleboro prevents us from coming to the very conclusion that 
our brothers subsequently came to in Mars Home.   
 This argument lacks merit for two reasons.  First, it 
misreads Attleboro by erroneously concluding that it rejected 
the general and context specific interpretations of independent 
judgment at issue here.  Second, it applies the incorrect 
standard of deferential review to the administrative decision.  
Because the Majority’s opinion misconstrues Mars Home, 
misreads Attleboro, and applies the wrong standard of review, 
I respectfully dissent.1  
                                                        
1 I concur with Sections I, II, and III. 
2  
I.  
 In addressing New Vista’s challenge to this NLRB 
decision, we must apply the familiar two-step analysis of 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo 
Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 
485 U.S. 568, 574 (1988) (“[S]tatutory interpretation by the 
[National Labor Relations] Board would normally be entitled 
to deference unless that construction were clearly contrary to 
the intent of Congress.” (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. 837 at 842–
43, and n. 9)). “If Congress has directly and clearly spoken to 
the precise question at issue, our Chevron analysis is complete 
at Step One, and Congress’s unambiguously expressed intent 
controls.”  Helen Mining Co. v. Elliott, 859 F.3d 226, 234 (3d 
Cir. 2017).   
 “[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to 
the specific issue,” we move to the second step of the inquiry 
and determine whether Congress expressly or implicitly 
delegated authority.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.  “If 
Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill,” “[s]uch 
legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they 
are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”  
Id. at 843–44.  If “the legislative delegation to an agency on a 
particular question is implicit rather than explicit,” “a court 
may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision 
for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an 
agency.”  Id. at 844.   
 We follow these steps even if we have already 
interpreted the statute unless our earlier decision decided the 
case on the first step.  Indeed, in National Cable & 
Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet Services, 
3  
the Supreme Court held that “[a] court’s prior judicial 
construction of a statute trumps an agency construction 
otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court 
decision holds that its construction follows from the 
unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for 
agency discretion.”  545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005).2  II.  
 We must decide this case under Chevron’s most 
deferential standard of review.  This case hinges on the 
NLRA’s definition of a supervisor.  That statutory text 
provides as follows: 
The term “supervisor” means any individual 
having authority, in the interest of the employer, 
to . . . discipline other employees . . . or 
effectively to recommend such action, if in 
connection with the foregoing the exercise of 
such authority is not of a merely routine or 
clerical nature, but requires the use of 
independent judgment. 
                                                        
2 See also Levy v. Sterling Holding Co., LLC, 544 F.3d 493, 
502 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[T]he Supreme Court left no doubt that if 
a court of appeals interprets an ambiguous statute one way, and 
the agency charged with administering that statute 
subsequently interprets it another way, even that same court of 
appeals may not then ignore the agency’s more-recent 
interpretation.”).  
 
4  
29 U.S.C. § 152(11).  To determine whether an employee 
qualifies as a supervisor, we must answer three questions: 
“First, does the employee have authority to engage in 1 of the 
12 listed activities? Second, does the exercise of that authority 
require the use of independent judgment? Third, does the 
employee hold the authority in the interest of the employer?”  
Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. at 573–74 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Answering affirmatively to each 
and every question makes an employee a supervisor.  This case 
relates to the independent judgment prong of the inquiry.  
 Following the steps established by the Supreme Court 
in Chevron, we must first ask, has Congress “directly and 
clearly spoken to the precise question at issue[?]”  Helen 
Mining Co., 859 F.3d at 234.  The Supreme Court has held that 
Congress has not spoken clearly on the definition of 
independent judgment.  In NLRB v. Kentucky River Community 
Care, Inc., the Supreme Court found that “it is certainly true 
that the statutory term ‘independent judgment’ is ambiguous 
with respect to the degree of discretion required for 
supervisory status” and that “[i]t falls clearly within the 
Board’s discretion to determine, within reason, what scope of 
discretion qualifies.”  532 U.S. 706, 713 (2001) (emphasis in 
original).   
 Because “the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect 
to the specific issue,” we move to the second step of the inquiry 
and determine whether Congress expressly or implicitly 
delegated authority.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.  The 
Supreme Court has held that Congress expressly delegated the 
NLRA’s interpretation to the NLRB.  In ABF Freight System, 
Inc. v. NLRB, the Supreme Court noted that because the 
NLRB’s interpretation of the NLRA “involves that kind of 
express delegation, the Board’s views merit the greatest 
5  
deference.”  510 U.S. 317, 324 (1994) (emphasis added).  As a 
result, “[S]tatutory interpretation by the Board would normally 
be entitled to deference unless that construction were clearly 
contrary to the intent of Congress.”  Edward J. DeBartolo 
Corp., 485 U.S. at 574 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. 837 at 842–
43, and n. 9).  Cf. Kentucky River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. at 
715 (refusing to defer to an NLRB interpretation that was 
“directly contrary to the text of the statute” (emphasis added)).  
A. 
 In light of this framework, we must defer to the NLRB’s 
interpretation of independent judgment because it is not 
“arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”  
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44. 
 In this case, the Regional Director followed a four step 
process.  First, the Regional Director provided the following 
definition of a statutory supervisor: 
Individuals are “statutory supervisors if: (1) they 
hold the authority to engage in any one of the 12 
listed supervisory functions, (2) their exercise of 
such authority is not of a merely routine or 
clerical nature, but requires the use of 
independent judgment, and (3) their authority is 
held in the interest of the employer.”   
App. 863 (Kentucky River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. at 713).  
 Second, the Regional Director determined whether the 
individuals had the authority to engage in supervisory 
functions, such as assigning work, responsibly directing, 
6  
disciplining, effectively recommending discipline, and 
removing other employees from the floor.    
 Third, the Regional Director, relying on Oakwood 
Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. 686 (2006), defined 
independent judgment: “The Board found that the relevant test 
for supervisory status utilizing independent judgment is that 
‘an individual must at minimum act, or effectively recommend 
action, free of the control of others and form an opinion or 
evaluation by discerning and comparing data.’”  App. 866 
(quoting Oakwood Healthcare, 348 N.L.R.B at 693).   
 Fourth, the Regional Director found, in light of 
Oakwood Healthcare, that the LPNs did not exercise 
independent judgment in performing supervisory functions.  
With regard to effectively recommending discipline, the 
Regional Director provided the following test:  “To prevail, the 
Employer must prove that: (a) LPNs submit actual 
recommendations, and not merely anecdotal reports, (b) their 
recommendations are followed on a regular basis, (c) the 
triggering disciplinary incidents are not independently 
investigated by superiors, and (d) the recommendations result 
from the LPNs’ own independent judgment.”  App. 873.  
 The Regional Director denied the employer’s claims on 
the third prong of this test.  Specifically, he concluded that the 
employer had not shown that LPNs used independent judgment 
in performing this supervisory function because the employer 
did not prove that the purported supervisors’ managers 
followed their discipline recommendations without 
independently investigating them.  App. 874 (“[T]he record is 
silent as to whether Roldan’s superiors conducted an 
independent investigation of her claims . . . .”); id. at 874 (“No 
written documentary evidence regarding this [termination 
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recommendation] is part of the record.”).  He further noted that 
some of the employer’s own witnesses undermined the 
employer’s claims and one of the LPNs’ managers “testified 
that when she receives a discipline form from an LPN, she will 
ask for statements from the reporting nurse, the offending aide 
and any eyewitnesses.” Id. at 873.  See also id. (explaining that 
another LPN manager independently investigated a discipline 
recommendation made by an LPN).   
B. 
 In Mars Home, we approved of the three contested 
elements of the decision at bar. 3   First, we observed that 
“[t]here is a three-part test for determining supervisory status” 
and quoted the same test as the Regional Director did in the 
decision under review.  Id. at 853–54 (quoting Kentucky River 
Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. at 713).   
 Second, we, like the Regional Director in the case 
before us, adopted Oakwood Healthcare’s general 
interpretation of independent judgment and held, “A 
supervisor exercises independent judgment when he acts or 
recommends action ‘free of the control of others and form[s] 
an opinion or evaluation by discerning and comparing data.’”  
                                                        
3 The Majority observes that the Petitioner in “Mars Home for 
Youth did not cite Attleboro . . . .”  Maj. Op. at 57 n. 14.  This 
comes as little surprise.  As explained in this and the following 
sections, the NLRB decision reviewed by Attleboro lies in 
stark contrast to the one before us in Mars Home and the 
analogue we judge today.   
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Id. at 853–54 (quoting Oakwood Healthcare, 348 N.L.R.B. at 
692–93).    
 Third, we “considered Mars Home’s remaining” 
challenges to the Regional Director’s decision and “f[ou]nd 
them without merit.”  Id. at 855.  This final determination 
matters because the employer specifically objected to the 
Regional Director’s conclusions about the employees’ 
authority to use their independent judgment in effectively 
recommending discipline, Petitioner’s Br. at 51–60, Mars 
Home for Youth v. NLRB, Nos. 11–1250, 11–1590, 666 F.3d 
850 (3d Cir. 2011), and because the Regional Director’s 
decision on recommending discipline closely paralleled the 
decision at bar.4 
 Indeed, the Regional Director in Mars Home provided 
the following test for deciding whether an employee exercised 
independent judgment in effectively recommending discipline:  
In summary, a putative supervisor’s preparation 
of written counseling forms, write-ups or reports 
does not establish Section 2(11) authority, even 
if such documentation is part of a progressive 
disciplinary process, in the absence of evidence                                                         
4  The Majority claims that “Mars Home for Youth did not 
analyze the definition of ‘effectively to recommend’ 
‘discipline,’ 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) . . . .”  Maj. Op. at 57 n. 14.  
Perplexingly, it does not explain how we could “consider[] 
Mars Home’s remaining claims,” including its challenge to the 
Board’s decision about effectively recommending discipline, 
and “find [those claims] without merit,” Mars Home, 666 F.3d 
at 855, without analyzing them.     
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that 1) the putative supervisor has the discretion 
to decide whether to document the infractions 
(independent judgement [sic]); 2) the document 
is an “integral part of the [e]mployer’s 
progressive system in that they are used to 
document each phase of the disciplinary process 
and routinely result in actual discipline” 
(imposition of discipline); and 3) the 
documentation is accepted by higher 
management without independent investigation. 
Regional Director’s Decision and Direction of Election at 29–
30, Mars Home for Youth v. NLRB, Nos. 11–1250, 11–1590, 
666 F.3d 850 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Mars Home Regional Director 
Decision”).    
 This test mirrors the test used by the Regional Director 
in the decision under review.  Compare Mars Home Regional 
Director Decision at 29 (“1) the putative supervisor has the 
discretion to decide whether to document the infractions 
(independent judgement [sic])”) with App. 837 (“(d) the 
recommendations result from the LPNs’ own independent 
judgment.”); compare Mars Home Regional Director Decision 
at 29–30 ( 2) the disciplinary reports “routinely result in actual 
discipline”) with App. 837 (“(b) their recommendations are 
followed on a regular basis”); compare Mars Home Regional 
Director Decision at 30 (“3) the documentation is accepted by 
higher management without independent investigation”) with 
App. 837 (“(c) the triggering disciplinary incidents are not 
independently investigated by superiors”).  
 Like the Regional Director in the case at bar, the 
Regional Director in Mars Home applied this test by finding 
that two employees did not qualify as supervisors because their 
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supervisors independently investigated their recommendations 
for discipline.  For one, the Regional Director concluded that 
“Employer has failed to sustain its burden of proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence that [alleged supervisor] 
effectively recommended the termination of [an employee] 
within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act” because 
“[a]fter [the alleged supervisor’s] report was received by [the 
alleged supervisor’s manager], both [the alleged  supervisor’s 
manager] and [another manager] set up a time to talk by 
telephone with [the employee] about the matter in order to 
investigate the matter further.”  Mars Home Regional Director 
Decision at 34.  For the other alleged supervisor, the Regional 
Director came to the same conclusion because “the record is 
clear that the Employer has failed to sustain its burden of proof 
that the sexual harassment incident evinces Section 2(11) 
authority by the [alleged supervisor] to effectively recommend 
discipline and/or discharge” because “management officials 
made an independent investigation before reaching its 
termination decision.”  Id. at 35.   
 Thus, we have approved of the NLRB’s current 
interpretation of independent judgment both in general and in 
the context of recommending discipline.  As a result, these 
interpretations are not “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly 
contrary to the statute.”  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44.  The 
law requires me to defer to these NLRB interpretations and 
dismiss New Vista’s challenge.5                                                          
5 Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(“In our Court ‘the holding of a panel in a precedential opinion 
is binding on subsequent panels. Thus, no subsequent panel 
overrules the holding in a precedential opinion of a previous 
panel. Court en banc consideration is required to do so.’” 
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III. 
 The Majority takes a different approach.  It does not rely 
upon Mars Home.  Instead, the Majority holds that the 
Regional Director’s decision is “squarely at odds with our 
controlling precedent—specifically NLRB v. Attleboro 
Associates, Ltd., 176 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 1999),” and “remand[s] 
this case to the Board to allow it to determine whether the LPNs 
have the authority to effectively recommend discipline under 
Attleboro.”  Maj. Op. at 5. See also Id. at 47–48 (explaining 
Attleboro’s interpretation of supervisor in the context of 
recommending discipline).   
 In its ultimate footnote, the Majority cites Chevron and 
attempts to shoehorn its decision into this framework by 
writing that “the Board relies on an interpretation that we 
already held was an unreasonable interpretation of the statute 
in Attleboro” and that “Chevron or Brand X deference would 
not allow us to adopt an unreasonable interpretation.”  Maj. Op. 
at 57 n. 14.6  This attempt fails. 
                                                        
(quoting Policy of Avoiding Intra-circuit Conflict of Precedent, 
Internal Operating Procedures of the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals § 9.1)).  
6 In this footnote, the majority implies, in dicta, that the Board 
waived a deference based argument.  The briefing does not 
support this assertion.  New Vista conceded that “[t]he 
NLRB’s legal determinations are subject to plenary review, but 
with due deference to the NLRB’s expertise in labor matters 
[and] [t]he Court upholds the NLRB’s interpretations of the 
NLRA if they are reasonable and consistent with the NLRA.”  
Petitioner’s Br. at 53–54.  The NLRB agreed with New Vista’s 
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A. 
 The Majority misreads Attleboro.  The Majority holds 
that “the Board relies on an interpretation that we already held 
was an unreasonable interpretation of the statute in Attleboro.”  
Maj. Op. at 57 n. 14.  The Majority does not distinguish 
between the general and context specific interpretations of 
independent judgment or explain which interpretation 
Attleboro held was unreasonable.  To prove that Attleboro did 
not regard any of these interpretations as unreasonable, I 
analyze each of them in turn. 
 Attleboro did not reject the Regional Director’s general 
interpretation of independent judgment.  It refused to defer to 
the NLRB’s “conclu[sion] that the ‘discharge of duties 
involving professional judgment and discretion may 
nonetheless be “routine” within the meaning of Section 2(11)’ 
and not the exercise of ‘independent judgment.’”  Attleboro, 
176 F.3d at 170.   Here, the Regional Director “found that the 
relevant test for supervisory status utilizing independent 
judgment is that ‘an individual must at minimum act, or 
effectively recommend action, free of the control of others and 
form an opinion or evaluation by discerning and comparing 
data.’” App. 866 (citing Oakwood Healthcare, 348 N.L.R.B at 
693).  This interpretation springs from Oakwood Healthcare,                                                         
concession, noting, “Whether an individual is a statutory 
supervisor is a question of fact particularly suited to the 
Board’s expertise and therefore subject to limited judicial 
review.”  Respondent’s Br. at 18.  Even if the parties did not 
raise it, this question constitutes an antecedent legal question 
that we must decide.  See Haybarger v. Lawrence Cty. Adult 
Probation & Parole, 667 F.3d 408, 412–13 (3d Cir. 2012).   
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348 N.L.R.B. at 692–93, a decision issued seven years after 
Attleboro.  As a result, Attleboro did not find that the NLRB’s 
general interpretation of independent judgment was 
unreasonable.  
 Furthermore, Attleboro did not hold that the particular 
context specific interpretation of independent judgment at 
issue here was unreasonable.  Attleboro’s decision on 
effectively recommending discipline consists of three parts.  
None of these parts support the Majority’s position.   
 First, we noted that the Regional Director found that an 
LPN could not exercise independent judgment “because the 
Director of Nurses reviewed the recommendations and 
sometimes would investigate an incident before acting upon a 
recommendation . . . .”  Attleboro, 176 F.3d at 164 (emphasis 
added).  Then, “We h[e]ld this application of the term 
‘independent judgment’ to the facts of this case erroneous as a 
matter of law.”  Id. (emphasis added).   
 This holding does not substantiate the Majority’s 
position.  Unlike in Attleboro, we now review a Regional 
Director decision that omitted “sometimes” and stated the rule 
in more absolute terms: “To prevail, the Employer must prove 
that . . . the triggering disciplinary incidents are not 
independently investigated by superiors . . . .”  App. 873.  In 
applying this rule, the Regional Director could not find a single 
example of when the employer accepted a discipline 
recommendation without investigating it.  Id. at 873–74.  As a 
result, the Regional Director found that the LPNs could not 
have exercised independent judgment because the employer 
always—not sometimes—investigated the recommendation 
before accepting it.  Because the context specific interpretation 
of independent judgment here differs from the one rejected by 
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Attleboro, Attleboro could not have dismissed—let alone 
considered—the context specific interpretation of independent 
judgment at issue here.  
 Second, Attleboro “h[e]ld that because Attleboro’s LPN 
charge nurses . . . initiate a progressive disciplinary process that 
becomes part of a CNA’s permanent personnel file and could 
lead to her termination, the charge nurses effectively 
recommend discipline using independent judgment within the 
meaning of section 2(11).”  Attleboro, 176 F.3d at 165.   
 This interpretation does not foreclose all other 
interpretations.  “[T]he statutory term ‘independent judgment’ 
is ambiguous with respect to the degree of discretion required 
for supervisory status” and “[i]t falls clearly within the Board’s 
discretion to determine, within reason, what scope of discretion 
qualifies.”  Kentucky River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. at 713 
(emphasis in original).  We have previously held that 
“Congress has not spoken on the ‘precise question’ before us” 
when a statutory term “is susceptible to multiple 
interpretations, and the statutory language does not directly 
address” the issue presented.  Egan v. Del. River Port Auth., 
851 F.3d 263, 270 (3d Cir. 2017). 7   Because independent 
judgment is an ambiguous term and because ambiguous terms 
are susceptible to multiple meanings, independent judgment is 
susceptible to multiple meanings.  As a result, our previous 
                                                        
7 See also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 n. 11 (“The court need not 
conclude that the agency construction was the only one it 
permissibly could have adopted to uphold the construction, or 
even the reading the court would have reached if the question 
initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding.”). 
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interpretation of “independent judgment” does not prohibit all 
other interpretations.  
 Third, in Attleboro we provided a detailed synopsis of 
Glenmark Associates, Inc. v. NLRB, 147 F.3d 333, 342 (4th 
Cir. 1998), noted that “[t]he situation at Attleboro is a hybrid 
of those of the nursing homes in Glenmark,” Attleboro, 176 
F.3d at 165, and observed that “the court recognized that the 
NLRA does not preclude a charge nurse from having 
supervisory status merely because her recommendation is 
subject to a superior’s investigation.”  Id. at 164.   
 This summary of Glenmark does not make the 
interpretation at issue here unreasonable.  Importantly, 
Attleboro’s summary of Glenmark is dicta.  If language “was 
not necessary to our holding,” it “was therefore dicta.”  IMO 
Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 261 n. 4 (3d Cir. 
1998).  This language was not necessary to our holding in 
Attleboro.  In Attleboro, we rejected a decision that found that 
an LPN did not qualify as a supervisor because her 
recommendation was sometimes subject to the employer’s 
investigation.  176 F.3d at 164.  Glenmark, according to our 
summary, rejected a decision that found that an LPN did not 
qualify as a supervisor because her recommendation was 
always subject to the employer’s investigation.  Id.  Holding 
that one investigation of a recommendation may not prevent 
someone from qualifying as a supervisor would not stop a 
future court from holding that two instances of investigating 
recommendations prohibited someone from being a 
supervisor.  As a result, the Glenmark observation was not 
necessary to our holding in Attleboro. 
 Even if it were not dicta, I would be reluctant to follow 
it.  Indeed, the Fourth Circuit has regarded Glenmark as no 
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longer binding.  Palmetto Prince George Operating, LLC v. 
NLRB, 841 F.3d 211 (4th Cir. 2016).  In that case, an employer 
refused to bargain collectively with LPNs on the theory that the 
LPNs qualified as supervisors.  Id. at 214.  In front of the 
NLRB’s Regional Director and then before the Fourth Circuit, 
the employer “maintain[ed], however, that our analysis of 
‘independent judgment’ in cases involving nurses issued prior 
to Kentucky River and Oakwood is in all respects ‘consistent’ 
with those cases, and so governs the case at hand.”  Id. at 216.   
 The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that before Oakwood 
Healthcare, the NLRB had interpreted independent judgment 
to exclude “ordinary professional or technical judgment in 
directing less-skilled employees to deliver services,” and that 
the Fourth Circuit had rejected that interpretation as 
unreasonable.  Id.  The Fourth Circuit cited Glenmark, the 
inspiration for Attleboro, as an example of a case that rejected 
the NLRB’s pre-Oakwood Healthcare interpretation and 
summarized it as “holding that nurses were supervisors given 
their authority to schedule and discipline nursing assistants 
without management approval . . . .”  Id.  It rejected this 
argument, the very argument that the Majority makes here, in 
three steps.  
 First, it observed that “[i]t is settled law that an agency 
construction entitled to deference supersedes a prior judicial 
construction of an ambiguous statute.” Id. (citing Brand X 
Internet Servs., 545 U.S. at 982).  Second, it noted that 
Oakwood Healthcare’s interpretation of the statute deserved 
deference because the statute was ambiguous and the 
interpretation was reasonable.  Id.  Third, it concluded, based 
on Kentucky River and Oakwood Healthcare—not 
Glenmark—that the employer “simply has not shown that the 
Nurses must use any independent judgment when performing 
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these functions.”  Id. at 217.  Specifically, it held that “[t]he 
record before us indicates that [the employer] has given its 
Nurses only the disciplinary power provided to every other 
employee (including CNAs themselves): the power to report 
rule violations to the Managers.”  Id. at 218.  As a result, 
Palmetto eviscerated Glenmark’s power in this context.  
B. 
 Even if the Majority’s reading of Attleboro were 
correct, I could not join the Majority because it misapplies 
Chevron here.  At its second step, Chevron asks us to determine 
whether “Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to 
fill” or if “the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular 
question is implicit . . . .”  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44.  If 
Congress explicitly left a gap to fill, “[s]uch legislative 
regulations are given controlling weight unless they are 
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”  Id. 
at 843–44.  On the other hand, if Congress implicitly left a gap 
to fill, “a court may not substitute its own construction of a 
statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the 
administrator of an agency.”  Id. at 844.   
 Here, the Majority focuses on the interpretation’s 
reasonableness—not its arbitrariness, capriciousness, or 
manifestly contrariness—when it writes that “Chevron or 
Brand X deference would not allow us to adopt an 
unreasonable interpretation.” Maj. Op. at 57 n. 14.  Thus, it 
assumes that the less deferential implicit delegation standard 
applies.  It makes this assumption without addressing the 
Supreme Court’s conclusions that the NLRB’s interpretations 
of the NLRA “involves that kind of express delegation,” ABF 
Freight System, Inc., 510 U.S. at 324 (emphasis added), and 
that “statutory interpretation by the Board would normally be 
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entitled to deference unless that construction were clearly 
contrary to the intent of Congress.” Edward J. DeBartolo 
Corp., 485 U.S. at 574 (1988) (emphasis added).   
IV. 
 A majority of New Vista’s LPNs voted to avail 
themselves of protections created by Congress.  The agency 
responsible for providing those rights found that the LPNs 
deserved them.  In coming to this conclusion, the agency took 
an approach that we had previously sanctioned in Mars Home.  
However, the Majority casts away this agency’s decision with 
passing reference to our previous precedential approval.  
Instead of following this precedent, the Majority harkens back 
to Attleboro and incorrectly claims that Attleboro rejected the 
agency’s approach before us—an approach we are duty bound 
to approve.  Because Attleboro did not regard the decision at 
bar as “manifestly contrary to the statute,” Chevron, 467 U.S. 
at. 844, I cannot join the Majority’s opinion.  I respectfully 
dissent.  
